Pregnant Females as Historical Individuals: An Insight From the Philosophy of Evo-Devo by Nuño de la Rosa, Laura et al.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 1 January 2021 | Volume 11 | Article 572106
HYPOTHESIS AND THEORY




University of Murcia, Spain
Reviewed by: 
Andrea Parravicini, 







†These authors have contributed 
equally to this work
Specialty section: 
This article was submitted to 
Theoretical and Philosophical 
Psychology, 
a section of the journal 
Frontiers in Psychology
Received: 12 June 2020
Accepted: 03 December 2020
Published: 20 January 2021
Citation:
Nuño de la Rosa L, Pavličev M and 
Etxeberria A (2021) Pregnant 
Females as Historical Individuals: An 




Pregnant Females as Historical 
Individuals: An Insight From the 
Philosophy of Evo-Devo
Laura Nuño de la Rosa 1†, Mihaela Pavličev 2† and Arantza Etxeberria 3*†
1 Department of Logic and Theoretical Philosophy, Complutense University of Madrid, Ciudad Universitaria, Madrid, Spain, 
2 Department of Theoretical Biology, University of Vienna, Vienna, Austria, 3 Department of Logic and Philosophy of Science, 
IAS Research Center for Life, Mind, and Society, University of the Basque Country, UPV/EHU, Donostia-San Sebastián, Spain
Criticisms of the “container” model of pregnancy picturing female and embryo as separate 
entities multiply in various philosophical and scientific contexts during the last decades. In 
this paper, we examine how this model underlies received views of pregnancy in evolutionary 
biology, in the characterization of the transition from oviparity to viviparity in mammals and 
in the selectionist explanations of pregnancy as an evolutionary strategy. In contrast, recent 
evo-devo studies on eutherian reproduction, including the role of inflammation and new 
maternal cell types, gather evidence in favor of considering pregnancy as an evolved 
relational novelty. Our thesis is that from this perspective we can identify the emergence of 
a new historical individual in evolution. In evo-devo, historical units are conceptualized as 
evolved entities which fulfill two main criteria, their continuous persistence and their 
non-exchangeability. As pregnancy can be individuated in this way, we contend that pregnant 
females are historical individuals. We argue that historical individuality differs from, and 
coexists with, other views of biological individuality as applied to pregnancy (the physiological, 
the evolutionary and the ecological one), but brings forward an important new insight which 
might help dissolve misguided conceptions.
Keywords: evo-devo, individuality, pregnancy, reproduction, historical kinds, novelty
INTRODUCTION
The individuality of pregnancy constitutes an intriguing philosophical problem concerning the 
kind and number of biological individuals and the process of individuation involved. Kingma’s 
(2018, 2019a) metaphysical work has been pivotal for the recent philosophical reintroduction 
of the topic of pregnancy. Focusing on parthood relations, Kingma confronts the received 
view of pregnancy, where females are conceptualized as “containers” of their offspring,1 and 
argues that embryos are instead a part of a larger whole that she calls “the gravida.”
Earlier philosophical reflections on pregnancy had already criticized the container model 
as a view deeply entrenched both in biomedical care and everyday life, and emphasized the 
importance of examining the special nature of the relations between females and embryos. 
For instance, Young (1990) observed that pregnancy deserves phenomenological attention because 
it constitutes a unique way of being an individual, one involving an inner relation with another 
being, which is partly identical and partly extraneous to the pregnant subject. Similarly, Howes 
(2008) elaborated on the topic of pregnancy from an immunological perspective, and considered 
1 Following Blackburn and Starck (2015) we  use the term “embryo” in a broad sense (from implantation to birth) that 
also includes fetuses.
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that both the classical container model and the understanding 
of the embryo as a part of “the mother’s flesh” fail to acknowledge 
the importance of the dynamic material relations between 
females and embryos.
As the aforementioned philosophers suggest, the prevalent 
biomedical conceptions of pregnancy, characterized by a 
consideration of female and embryo as separate biological entities, 
need to be  reexamined. Just like insect colonies, symbiotic 
organisms, or the Portuguese Man-O-War, pregnancy challenges 
in its own way the commonsense delineation of biological entities 
as distinct, self-enclosed, and independent individuals. However, 
the problem of the individuality of pregnancy has received scarce 
attention within the philosophical community discussing biological 
individuality (but see Kingma, 2019b). The perspective we adopt 
in this article pays attention to recent work on the evolution 
of reproduction, in particular relevant evolutionary developmental 
biology (evo-devo) on pregnancy, to examine the philosophical 
question of the kind and number of individuals involved.
The field of evolution is certainly overrepresented in philosophical 
debates on biological individuality (Pradeu, 2016a). However, the 
implications of evo-devo studies for the individuation of living 
entities are often ignored. Even those critical of the sufficiency 
of evolutionary notions of individuality still tend to associate 
evolution with selection. In contrast with this trend, we  show 
that extant notions of individuality do not faithfully grasp the 
unique biological features of pregnancy as they are highlighted 
in our evolutionary account, and that new criteria for historical 
individuation used in evo-devo render significant new insights 
on biological individuality.
The structure of our argument will be  as follows. First, 
we reconstruct two main assumptions underlying the established 
account of pregnancy in evolutionary biology. Then, we present 
new studies on the evo-devo of pregnancy that show that the 
received understanding of reproductive modes as strategies for 
maximizing fitness does not suffice to explain eutherian 
pregnancy, insofar as it fails to consider the relational properties 
of reproduction and their material evolution. Thereupon, 
we  elaborate an alternative account based on the hypothesis 
that pregnancy is an evolved relational novelty that gives rise 
to a new kind of historical individual. In the last section, 
we  discuss how this notion differs from, but may also coexist 
with, other concepts of biological individuality.
RECEIVED VIEWS ON THE EVOLUTION 
OF PREGNANCY
In this section, we provide a concise overview of the narratives 
that underlie classical views on pregnancy in evolutionary 
biology.2 These views have long-reaching consequences for 
2 Social representations of scientific knowledge use metaphors influenced by 
social stereotypes (see e.g., Wagner et  al., 1995 for the topic of conception), 
but also scientific accounts are influenced by social, and particularly by gender 
biases (see Martin, 1991, for the same topic). The language used in biological 
accounts of pregnancy is a particularly good illustration of how the social 
perception of a biological process has influenced its scientific interpretation, 
and vice versa.
the conceptualization of the individuals involved in pregnancy, 
some of which we  review in this section, focusing on two 
main threads, namely: the emphasis on an evolutionary 
continuity between oviparity and viviparity, and the explanation 
of pregnancy as an evolutionary strategy for maximizing 
fitness.
Firstly, the literature on the evolution of pregnancy 
emphasizes a form of evolutionary continuity from oviparity 
to viviparity, in which the functions of protecting and nourishing 
the embryo that are fulfilled by special structures in oviparous 
animals (e.g., the egg shell and yolk) are transferred to the 
physiology of the pregnant female in viviparous animals. 
Accordingly, continuity is pictured as an evolutionary process 
of spatial internalization (Rosslenbroich, 2014). In the context 
of provisioning, pregnancy is regarded as a switch in patterns 
of embryo nutrition, from retrieving the nutrients for 
development from the yolk to extracting them directly from 
the mother via the placenta.3
Central to this narrative is the way in which the placenta, 
an organ of embryonic origin, has attracted enormous attention 
in studies of pregnancy as being the site of materialization 
of mother-fetus communication.
The easy accessibility of embryonal placental (in contrast 
to maternal uterine) tissue has likely played a major role in 
biasing the attention towards this organ, rather than to the 
uterus, as reflected by the number of scientific associations 
dedicated to placental research, or by the fact that there is 
a prominent journal devoted to it. Two major (recently revised) 
assumptions in evolutionary biology have further contributed 
to the centrality of the placenta in the conceptualization of 
pregnancy. One of them is the identification of the evolution 
of mammals with that of the placenta. In fact, the naming 
of Eutheria as “placental mammals” not only gives the wrong 
impression that the placenta is unique to eutherians, when 
also marsupials have one (Renfree, 2010). It also suggests 
that the placenta is the key innovation in the evolution of 
eutherian pregnancy. Altogether they seem to contend that 
the major evolutionary changes towards viviparity occurred 
solely on the embryonic side. The other assumption concerns 
the view that “invasive placentation” has deepened in evolution. 
There is a great diversity of placental types among eutherian 
species, with different degrees of penetration into the uterine 
wall; from superficial placentas, where several maternal and 
fetal tissue layers separate the maternal and fetal blood, to 
highly imbricated forms of placentation (so-called hemochorial) 
where fetal tissues are exposed directly to maternal blood. 
Since Haeckel’s times until very recently, the belief in 
evolutionary biology has been that early eutherian species 
had superficial placentas, and that “invasive placentation” is 
the most derived form of female-embryo interaction (see 
Wildman et  al., 2006, for references).
3 The placenta evolved from the vascularized membranes of the yolk sac and/
or allantois, which in oviparous animals supply nutrients from yolk and gas 
exchange with the external environment. In contrast, in viviparous mammals 
the membranes fuse with the chorion to form the placenta, which attaches to 
the uterine wall and serves as continuous mediator of nutrients and gas exchange 
with the maternal blood (Ramsey, 1982; Carter, 2012).
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Viviparity or live-bearing reproduction is a widespread 
reproductive mode that has arisen independently in many 
lineages of invertebrate as well as vertebrate animals (Wake, 
2004), the latter including not only most mammals but also 
several clades of fishes, amphibians, and reptiles. Yet, despite 
a clearly eutherian-dominated view of viviparity that 
underestimates other forms of viviparity (Blackburn, 2015), 
we believe that the emphasis on the continuity between oviparity 
and viviparity in mammals has contributed to blurring some 
of the special characteristics of eutherian pregnancy. The 
perception of pregnancy as derived from oviparity by a simple 
spatial internalization followed by the gradual evolution of 
invasive placentation, supports an interpretation of eutherian 
reproduction as a mere superimposition of the embryo’s 
physiology on the maternal physiology, and contributes to the 
treatment of mother and embryo as semi-independent entities 
(Abbot and Rokas, 2017), and particularly to that of the pregnant 
female as a container to which the embryo is merely attached 
for nutrition.
This narrative about the phylogeny of pregnancy sets the 
ground for the second major component of classical 
evolutionary narratives of eutherian reproduction, namely 
the view of pregnancy as an evolutionary strategy involving 
costs and benefits for parents and offspring. In this frame, 
the explanation of the transition from oviparity to viviparity 
in mammals weighs the fitness costs and benefits of this 
transition for the female and her offspring, treating them 
as different units of selection (see Crespi and Semeniuk, 
2004; Bainbridge, 2014, for reviews). In general, the 
internalization of development provided by viviparity is 
suggested to have major advantages for the offspring (such 
as increased survivorship by avoiding the vulnerable egg 
stage, increased birth size, and offspring vigor due to prolonged 
maternal provisioning), while entailing a mixture of advantages 
and costs for females. Advantages include greater mobility 
and smaller eggs, which are less costly to discard when 
unfertilized. The costs range from reduced foraging ability 
and higher susceptibility to predation during pregnancy, total 
brood loss upon death, higher energetic costs, lower fecundity, 
and lesser ability to interrupt the reproductive process and 
discard the offspring when conditions change abruptly. In 
sum, one should not consider that viviparity constitutes a 
good solution for both mothers and offspring in evolutionary 
adaptive terms (Avise, 2013).
The non-optimality of the “pregnancy solution” is explicit 
in a well-known hypothesis on the evolution of pregnancy, 
the so-called “conflict hypothesis”, which confronts the view 
of pregnancy as a “cooperative interaction between a mother 
and her fetus” and points instead to the potential for conflicting 
“interests” between maternal and fetal genes (Haig, 1993, 
p.  495; see also Haig, 1996). As a consequence, the genetic 
interests of mothers and embryos, understood as different 
individuals, are not perfectly aligned. The reasoning for this 
comes from Hamilton’s concept of inclusive fitness, following 
which the calculation of the fitness of an individual is obtained 
by adding the fitness contribution of relatives, weighed by 
the relatedness, to the direct effects on fitness. Given that 
mothers are likely to be more related to their further offspring 
than the current embryo (as current and future offspring 
may have different fathers), maternal investment in current 
pregnancy is expected to be lower than the embryo’s. According 
to David Haig, embryonic genes will thus be  selected for 
gaining more nutrients from the mother, whereas maternal 
genes will be  selected to limit that transfer. The strongest 
evidence in favor of genetic conflict are imprinted genes (i.e., 
those in which expression of alleles depends on the parent-
of-origin) in the placenta. The hypothesis predicts that paternal 
alleles will follow the interests of the embryo, and increase 
maternal investment and/or prolong pregnancy, whereas the 
effects of maternal alleles will align with maternal interests 
and reduce investment. From this perspective, “the parent-
offspring conflict over the degree of parental investment” is 
widely seen as “the main selective factor in the evolution of 
reproduction” (Lodé, 2012, p.  259).
All in all, the evolutionary view of pregnancy as a locus 
of conflict where the embryo attempts to “manipulate” the 
mother (see Crespi and Semeniuk, 2004) conforms with 
traditional approaches to the physiology of pregnancy. 
Biological and biomedical accounts of pregnancy often present 
it as a conflictual relationship between two independent 
entities, a “battle,” or a “combat” (Ashary et  al., 2018) where 
the embryo uses “a variety of coercive tactics” (Ashary et  al., 
2018) to “manipulate” (Crespi and Semeniuk, 2004) and 
“invade” the mother. As a consequence, the role of the mother 
is often still presented as a passive or defensive one, as 
reflected in the biomedical depictions of the immune reaction 
of pregnant females upon implantation (Mor, 2007). Immune 
response in pregnant females would be  expected for two 
reasons: first, because the embryo breaches physical tissue 
integrity during implantation, and second, because this 
wounding is caused by a tissue which is immunologically 
different from the female. However, as there is no maternal 
rejection of the embryo, traditional approaches have aimed 
to understand how the expected maternal immune reaction 
to implantation is “suppressed” by the fetus, for example 
via the manipulation of progesterone production, thus leading 
to an “immunological indolence or inertness of the mother” 
(Medawar, 1953; see Stadtmauer and Wagner, 2020a,b and 
references therein).
The explanations of pregnancy as an evolutionary strategy 
involving costs and benefits for parents and offspring, in 
continuous conflict over provisioning, and in which the female 
is manipulated by the embryo against her interests, reinforce 
the view of pregnancy as involving two separate individuals 
following their own interests, rather than as a reproductive 
process promoting constructive relations between mother and 
offspring. Nonetheless, this view of pregnancy as a conflict 
is not the only possible view of pregnancy as an evolutionary 
strategy. Indeed, recent models have proposed that co-adaptation 
(rather than conflict) between genes expressed in mother and 
those expressed in offspring has played a major role in the 
evolution of pregnancy and may offer a complementary 
explanation for imprinted genes (Wolf and Hager, 2006). While 
the treatment of maternal and offspring fitness interests in 
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conflict theories conceives them as having separate interests, 
the coadaptation models assign a fitness advantage to the 
interaction itself, namely, to pregnancy. Interestingly, in these 
models the fitness interests of mothers and embryos are not 
only aligned, but are interdependent, i.e., fitness advantages 
to the mother depend on the co-evolutionary change in 
the fetus.
In sum, eutherian pregnancy has been studied from the 
perspective of there being two separate individuals, each with 
their own interests in evolution. As we  argue in the following 
section, evo-devo studies of pregnancy support an alternative 
perspective which, instead of assuming that the results of 
reproduction (i.e., separate individuals) already operate in 
pregnancy, claims for an alternative individuation of pregnancy 
as the locus of developmental reproduction. In the context of 
the evolution of eutherian reproduction, this new kind of 
reproductive system constitutes what we  will call a historical 
individual. From this perspective, it will be  shown that the 
conflict models picturing mothers and embryos as distinct 
evolutionary individuals offer a partial account of the individuality 
of pregnancy, not only from the perspective of “proximate” 
disciplines such as physiology or developmental biology, but 
also from an evolutionary standpoint.
EVO-DEVO OF PREGNANCY
The way reproduction is considered in the neo-Darwinian 
tradition is the consequence of a long historical trajectory of 
work reinforcing the view that the transmission of heritable 
variation occurs independently of, and previously to, 
development. As a consequence, reproduction has been 
considered to consist mainly of the problem of replication, 
often reduced to a formal process of copy-making or a mere 
transmission of information (Dawkins, 1982). However, in the 
last decades, philosophers and evolutionary biologists have 
denounced that reproduction is a lot more complex than 
replication, as it entails the material transfer of parts from 
parents to offspring (Maturana and Varela, 1987; Griesemer, 
2000a, 2005), as well as the reconstruction, rather than the 
mere transmission, of phenotypes (Jablonka, 2004; Gilbert and 
Epel, 2008).4 Therefore, reproduction and development cannot 
be  distinguished so easily, insofar as the re-production of 
organisms is regarded as a material, organizational and 
developmental process, involving both the transfer of parts 
and the interplay of a pleiad of biotic and abiotic factors 
which, in the case of pregnancy, include the active role of 
4 While there have been recent attempts to improve the understanding of 
reproduction from a Darwinian perspective, they still regard eutherian 
reproduction essentially as the capacity to make reliable copies of an individual 
entity. For instance, Godfrey-Smith’s (2015) recent distinction of different 
forms of reproduction classifies eutherian mammals as “collective” reproducers 
which, just like any other multicellular, have parts with the capacity to 
reproduce, while viruses are seen as “scaffolded” reproducers whose reproduction 
depends on external resources. In contrast, from the reproducers perspective, 
almost all cases of reproduction are seen as scaffolded (Griesemer, 2014a,b; 
Minelli, 2016).
females in the developmental reproduction of their offspring. 
In this sense, our view of reproduction follows many important 
philosophical discussions that have emphasized the importance 
of a developmentally minded and diachronically constructive 
view of ontogeny (Oyama, 2000), as well as the active role 
of organisms as adaptive agents in evolution (Walsh, 2015).
Despite the theoretical pleas for considering the materiality 
of reproduction, the evolution of modes of reproduction has 
remained largely unexplored so far. As Fusco and Minelli (2019) 
have recently denounced, “generalizations of the phenomenon 
of reproduction” may “have hidden the diversity of reproductive 
phenomena frequently found even among closely related taxa” 
(p. xiii). One further influencing factor for this may be  that 
the field of evo-devo has tended to focus on the evolution of 
body parts rather than on the evolution of relations among 
organismal entities or of new kinds of biological individualities. 
Yet, in the last decade, studies on the “evo-devo of reproduction” 
have started to revert this trend. Under this perspective, modes 
of reproduction are not only regarded as different strategies 
for maximizing fitness, but also as material developmental 
processes involving the transformation of complex relations 
among organismal entities. In the remainder of this section, 
we present some results of recent evo-devo studies of eutherian 
reproduction and show how they support a conception of 
pregnancy that, in attributing a central importance to the 
evolved active maternal role and the relational novelties of 
pregnancy, significantly differs from the one presented in the 
previous section.
Recent studies emphasize that the evolution of pregnancy 
involved crucial innovations on the female side as a form of 
evolutionary reaccommodation (Stadtmauer and Wagner, 2020b). 
The origin of a new kind of integration between mother and 
embryo entailed an integral rearrangement of the interactions 
among the main physiological systems of the female, namely 
the nervous system (brain and neuroendocrine changes), the 
cardiovascular system (increased blood volume, decrease in 
hemoglobin concentration, and increased coagulation), the 
locomotor system (skeletomuscular changes in backbone, pelvis, 
and gait), and the immune and metabolic control systems 
(e.g., protein metabolism, and kidney capacity), to name a 
few (Bainbridge, 2014). All those re-accommodations involve 
a coevolution of extensive interdependencies between mother 
and offspring, both sides thus forming an evolving relational 
unit (e.g., Knoefler, 2010; Erlebacher, 2013; Moffet and Colucci, 
2014; Pavličev et  al., 2017). As we  highlighted in the previous 
section, previous studies have abundantly focused on the 
evolution of the placenta. In contrast, evo-devo studies reveal 
that the origin of eutherian pregnancy involved crucial relational 
innovations on both the embryo and the maternal side. This 
research also counteracts the received views of pregnancy as 
a superficial kind of internalization in which the mother signifies 
a form of a living shelter for the embryo.
On the embryo side, while the placenta has originated 
multiple times in evolution (Renfree, 2010; Roberts et  al., 
2016), the kind of placentation originating in the stem lineage 
of Eutheria is unique, in particular with regard to the degree 
of maternal-fetal integration it confers (Wildman et al., 2006). 
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Eutherian placentation breaches maternal integrity and is 
associated with implantation. In stark contrast to 
non-mammalian viviparous animals in which the placenta is 
only apposed to the uterine epithelium, the maternal-placental 
interface of eutherian mammals erodes the uterine epithelium 
or even the maternal vessel walls. As we  saw in the previous 
section, the received assumption on the evolution of the 
placenta was that invasive placentation evolved from superficial 
placentas with a shallow contact between the maternal and 
the embryonic tissues. In contrast, phylogenetic analyses have 
recently shown that the invasive placental type was indeed 
the ancestral state of all eutherians, indicating that eutherian 
pregnancy arose concomitantly with the origin of a highly 
entangled maternal-fetal interface (Mess and Carter, 2006; 
Wildman et  al., 2006).
On the maternal side, recent research has revealed that new 
specialized cell types, such as the decidual stromal cell, the 
uterine natural killer cell, and a specialized form of resident 
macrophages, evolved likely coincidentally with the evolution 
of pregnancy (Wagner et al., 2014; Erkenbrack et  al., 2018). 
Particularly interesting is the decidual stromal cell type, which 
evolved together with invasive placentation (Chavan et al., 2016; 
Erkenbrack et al., 2018). These maternal novelties likely enabled 
sustained implantation and therefore the evolution of the first 
step towards eutherian pregnancy. Just like in the case of the 
placenta, the novelty of the uterine cells relies not only on 
their inherent characteristics, but on their relational abilities, 
that is, on their capacities to communicate with other (in this 
case, genetically heterogeneous) cells (see Griffith and Wagner, 
2017). Indeed, impaired decidualization of endometrium has 
been shown to interfere with embryo-maternal interactions in 
humans, thus causing recurrent pregnancy loss (Salker et al., 2010).
Crucial to this new understanding of the relational novelties 
emerging in eutherian reproduction have been the studies on 
the role of inflammation in the origination and prolongation 
of pregnancy. Pregnancy has been traditionally described by 
reproductive biologists as a period between two discrete events, 
implantation and birth, both of which have been shown to 
entail inflammation (Mor, 2007; Mor and Cardenas, 2010; Mor 
et  al., 2011). Whereas in marsupials the inflammation caused 
by the first contact of the fertilized egg is followed by expulsion 
(birth), and thus the period of pregnancy is very short, in 
eutherian mammals inflammation is a required step for successful 
implantation and does not result in immediate birth. In eutherian 
pregnancy, the inflammatory response is thus modified by the 
maternal decidual cells to separate inflammatory implantation 
from expulsion (Chavan et  al., 2016; Griffith et  al., 2017). 
Thus, the maternal immune system is not simply suppressed. 
Rather, the evolution of decidual cells enabled its temporally 
and spatially local modification, making implantation possible 
(Mor and Cardenas, 2010; Mor et  al., 2017)5 and subsequently 
expanding pregnancy and maintaining an alternative stable 
homeostatic state. This sequence of events in eutherians evolved 
5 It is important to note that the modification of the immune reaction must 
be  local, not system-wide or persistent, because it would otherwise likely 
be  lethal for the mother.
after the last common ancestor with marsupials, who do not 
have decidual cells and react to attachment with expulsion. 
The eutherian novelty hence consists of the novel cell type 
enabling a prolonged intrauterine developmental stage to 
be  “inserted” between two inflammatory events, namely 
implantation and birth (Griffith et  al., 2017; Erkenbrack et  al., 
2018; see Figure  1).
In the next section, we  present our main claim that the 
evolutionary modifications that led to the origination of 
pregnancy (female integral reaccomodation, emergence of a 
new type of placentation and uterine cell type, and modification 
and repurposing of inflammation) may be  interpreted as a 
transition in individuality in which two individual processes, 
the adult female and the developing embryo, are merged into 
a single reproductive individual of a historical kind.
PREGNANT FEMALES AS HISTORICAL 
INDIVIDUALS
The features of the evolution of eutherian reproduction as 
reviewed in the previous section prompt us to propose that 
pregnant females constitute a new kind of individual appearing 
in evolution. In this section, we examine some of these features 
in the light of conceptual work on historical kinds developed 
in the field of evo-devo, and argue that pregnant females can 
be  considered to be  biological individuals of this historical 
kind. The notion of historical kind has been characterized as 
including “a subset of natural kinds that acquires, through 
evolutionary processes, a quasi independent lineage-history” 
(Wagner and Tomlinson, 2020, p. 1). Historical kinds “have 
a definite beginning and potentially an end” (Wagner, 2001, 
p. 10) and, therefore, allow to combine in the same concept, 
as two sides of the same coin, the evolutionary origination 
of new processes, structures and functions, and their historical 
persistence throughout evolutionary time.
FIGURE 1 | Viviparity is a shared derived trait of marsupials and eutherians. 
Embryo implantation, invasive placentation, and decidual stromal cells (DSC) 
occur only in the eutherian lineage [Adapted from Wagner et al. (2019), 
Figure 1, p. 2].
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Understanding individuality as a historical kind encompasses 
a set of criteria for individuation of evolutionary entities used 
in the context of evo-devo. The criteria used in this field to 
track the historical emergence and persistence of entities such 
as homologues and body plans, differ from the traditional 
criteria for evolutionary individuation, and enable evo-devo 
biologists to individuate evolutionary units in distinct ways. 
Evolutionary entities in evo-devo have been mainly 
conceptualized as types or natural kinds (see Wagner, 1996; 
Brigandt, 2017, for a review), and here we  propose to extend 
this view to kinds of individuals. While this perspective has 
classically been applied to the individuation of body parts, 
such as vertebrate limbs or cell types, it has also been extended 
to include developmental stages (e.g., larval vs. adult stage), 
physiological processes (e.g., menstruation or ovulation), or 
functions (e.g., behaviors; see, e.g., Gilbert and Bolker, 2001; 
Scholtz, 2005; Love, 2007). We  argue that the criteria for 
historical individuation can be further applied to entities arising 
in reproductive relations, and enable a view of the pregnant 
female as a new kind of individual, namely a historically 
new, semi-independently modifiable developmental stage in 
the life cycle of (some) eutherian females, with continuous 
persistence since its origination.
Criteria for Historical Kinds
Historical units are evolved entities or processes which fulfill 
certain criteria that allow us to recognize them as distinct, 
namely, their continuous persistence across taxa and throughout 
evolutionary time, and their non-exchangeability with other 
such units. As we  will see, pregnancy can be  inviduated in 
this way because it fulfills these two criteria.
The first criterion to track historical individuals, persistence, 
does not derive from the direct replication of an entity (such 
as a limb or a cell), but rather from those developmental 
processes that account for the historical continuity of an entity 
within and across species. As a consequence of their 
developmental autonomy, these entities can change or remain 
stable throughout evolution somewhat independently from 
others (Wagner and Altenberg, 1996). The classical example 
is the vertebrate limb, which adopts different shapes and sizes 
across vertebrates, adapted to different functions, but it yet 
persists as a distinct, developmentally grounded, historical kind.
The pregnant female as a historical individual evokes an 
evolutionarily persistent entity in which female and embryo 
are developmentally entangled. This is manifest in the form 
of a transient, but temporally demarcated, individuality 
characterized by a high degree of integration between female 
and embryo. As argued in the previous section, the origination 
of pregnancy entailed a major modification of the relational 
abilities of mammalian females, one that allowed pregnant 
females to internalize embryos as parts of a new reproductive 
system. The inflammatory events following implantation and 
preceding birth individuate pregnancy in time: both the onset 
and finalization of pregnancy are coordinated relational events 
between mother and embryo, rather than occurring when the 
embryo one-sidedly reaches certain stages of development or 
maturation. In this frame, reproduction is thus treated less as 
a point event in the lifetime marked by fertilization, and more 
as being itself a developmental process. This diachronic view 
of historical individuality as applied to the reproductive phase 
of pregnancy aligns, as suggested to us by an anonymous 
reviewer, with recent work on the biology of reproduction 
(Fusco and Minelli, 2019), where biological individuality is 
drafted within the framework of life cycle evolution (DiFrisco 
and Mossio, 2021).
Moreover, the persistence and distinctiveness of historical 
individuals are not only reflected in their evolutionary continuity 
but also in their distinctive ability to evolve. Therefore, as 
a consequence of individuation, eutherian pregnancy obtains 
a certain degree of evolvability on its own, insofar as it 
inaugurates new ways of generating variation and therefore 
new potential to evolve. The relative ability of the pregnant 
female to evolve as a unit is reflected, for example, in the 
variability of eutherian species in the length of gestation, or 
in the characteristic diversification of the maternal-placental 
interface (Carter and Enders, 2004).
The second criterion for historical individuality, 
non-exchangeability, captures the idea that the evolutionary 
autonomy of a new historical entity does not result from the 
disconnection of this entity from others, but rather from an 
evolutionary process of compensation and accommodation of 
developmental and physiological interdependencies within the 
organization of a body plan, thus resulting in a new kind of 
evolved integration. For example, if vertebrate hind limbs can 
be  individuated as historical individuals it is not only because 
they change independently of forelimbs (and of everything 
else), but because they are non-exchangeable. The reason is 
that, although they develop using some of the same genes 
and developmental pathways, hindlimbs are different (and evolve 
differently) from forelimbs also due to their integration in the 
distal part of the vertebrate body. In contrast, human hairs 
cannot be  considered as historical individuals: while they are 
physically independent entities, they are “exchangeable” in the 
sense that the identity of each hair does not depend on their 
particular location in the skin. The distinctiveness of historical 
kinds is thus based both in their evolutionary autonomy and 
in their evolved integration within the system they belong to.
From this perspective, the mode of evolution instantiated 
by the integral reaccommodation of all the physiological systems 
that make up eutherian reproduction (including the embryo) 
is not surprising. Evolution is a process in which new traits 
and relations emerge not by mere addition of new developmental 
stages or structures on top of the preexisting, conserved ones, 
but by the recruitment, modification and integration of the 
old into a new context (Alberch, 1985). Classic models in 
vertebrate evo-devo include studies on the origin and evolution 
of pharyngeal jaws, which involved the integration of changes 
in the visual, neural, skeletal, muscular, and behavioral systems. 
In the words of Brian Hall, “[s]uch studies move us away 
from identification of single key innovations and toward an 
emphasis on integrated changes and ontogenetic repatteming 
in interrelated systems” (Hall, 1998, p. 282). As we  saw in 
the previous section, the novelty of pregnancy not only entailed 
the emergence of new relational structures, processes, and 
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functions, but also the modification of a range of pre-existing 
physiological self-maintaining systems to support a distinctly 
new homeostatic state that incorporates the implanted embryo 
(Pavličev et al., 2017). Therefore, the individuation of pregnancy 
does not occur by decoupling pregnancy from the rest of 
female biology, but rather by the unique modifications of female 
physiology (i.e., capacity for changes in immune, metabolic, 
and locomotory systems) that enable pregnancy and hence 
integrate it with other developmental stages in its life cycle. 
This integration includes the accommodation of the embryo, 
as reflected in the evolution of the female immune system. 
In general, two evolutionary “solutions” to a conflicting situation 
(such as that triggered by the disruption of tissue integrity 
caused by embryo implantation) could be  considered. One 
might consist of removing the origin of the conflict entirely, 
and the other of integrating and modifying it.6 In contrast 
with the received understanding of pregnancy as an ongoing 
conflict, evo-devo studies of the origin of pregnancy suggest 
that implantation leads to a critical disruption of physiological 
homeostasis (Erkenbrack et al., 2018), followed by its overcoming, 
which results in a novel homeostatic state defined at the 
relational level. It is this new function and the associated 
developmental and physiological processes that evo-devo studies 
of eutherian reproduction aim at explaining.
The Origin of Pregnant Females as 
Historical Individuals
In contrast with the most prominent work from the 
neo-Darwinian perspective on pregnancy, evo-devo studies of 
eutherian reproduction concern the evolutionary origination, 
rather than the modification, of pregnancy. In this section, 
we  argue that the kind of transformations involved in this 
transition is not simply assimilable to an evolutionary novelty 
with an associated new function, as in the origin of characters 
such as feathers or paired fins. Rather, the origin of pregnancy 
has meaningful correspondences with major transitions such 
as the origin of eukaryotic cells or multicellulars, which often 
entail new modes of reproduction (Griesemer, 2000b) and the 
emergence of new levels of evolutionary individuality (Buss, 
1987; Michod, 2000).
On a first glance, the case of pregnancy does not seem 
to fit in the standard view of major transitions (Maynard 
Smith and Szathmary, 1997): unlike eukaryotic cells or 
multicellular organisms, pregnant females certainly do not 
reproduce directly into pregnant females. However, the systemic 
transformations and the radical changes in reproductive 
capacities experienced by eutherian females indicate that the 
origin of pregnancy had further evolutionary implications 
than that of a new reproductive character. In particular, the 
origin of eutherian reproduction did entail that “entities that 
were capable of independent reproduction before the transition, 
can reproduce only as parts of a larger whole after it” 
6 Wagner and co-authors go a step further to suggest that stress pathway-
inducing processes offer a particularly strong opportunity to generate novelties, 
by first internalizing, and then modifying an originally plastic stress response 
(Erkenbrack et  al., 2018; Wagner et  al., 2019).
(Griesemer, 2000b, p. 79). In this sense, the transition to 
pregnancy might be  considered as analogous to the transition 
to the eukaryotic cell, described by Godfrey-Smith (2015, 
p.  10123) as the event in which “two simple reproducers give 
rise to collective reproduction, followed by a loss of reproductive 
autonomy and the endosymbiont moving towards scaffolded 
reproduction.”  In an analogous way, eutherian pregnancy 
entailed a loss of reproductive autonomy at the level of the 
egg, but a gain of reproductive capacity at the new individual 
level constituted by the pregnant female. In this sense, pregnancy 
can be  considered as a last of the successive evolutionary 
stages of female integration of reproduction: from releasing 
an unfertilized egg to be  fertilized and developed externally, 
to internal fertilization followed by a largely external 
development (i.e., oviparity), to metatherian viviparity, in 
which case both fertilization as well as great part of development 
are incorporated within the female’s body. This integration 
importantly varies in extent and time: in some mammalian 
species, development has evolved to become integrated with 
reproduction until a certain stage (marsupials, those with an 
extremely short gestation period), while the extension of 
pregnancy has allowed eutherians to integrate development 
and reproduction until a much later stage. In eutherians, 
development and reproduction have become highly integrated 
processes, insofar as the reproducing individual (the pregnant 
female) needs to participate in the development of its offspring 
to achieve its own reproduction. To sum up: pregnant females 
form unique individuals, relating two developmental processes 
at different stages of their life histories. They are reproductive, 
relational, and transient individuals, although, like most 
biological individuals, they have a beginning and an end: 
they are born at implantation and end at birth.
In philosophical terms, the concept of historical individual 
as applied to pregnant females delivers a new insight to the 
notion of biological individual, one which is distinctly 
evolutionary and which differs from the conflict models. As 
pointed out in the introduction, philosophical debates on 
biological individuality have too often been posed in evolutionary 
terms to the detriment of other biological fields (Pradeu, 2016a, 
p. 765). However, it is important to stress that the implications 
for individuality of non-selectionist, developmental approaches 
to evolution have been also neglected. The thesis that pregnant 
females are historical novel individuals relies on an evolutionary 
stance, yet it is a very different one with regard to previous 
selectionist accounts. In the following section, the main concepts 
of individuality discussed in the philosophy of biology are 
reviewed and compared according to their adequacy to account 
for pregnancy in contrast to the historical notion advanced here.
PREGNANCY AND BIOLOGICAL 
INDIVIDUALITY
The nature of biological individuality has been a topic of intense 
inquiry in the philosophy of biology of the last decade (Ruiz-
Mirazo et al., 2000; Clarke, 2010; Pradeu, 2016a; DiFrisco, 2019), 
where received assumptions have been revised to respond to 
Nuño de la Rosa et al. Pregnant Females as Historical Individuals
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 8 January 2021 | Volume 11 | Article 572106
new challenges coming from entities that do not conform to 
traditional concepts of individuals considered as homogeneous, 
unique and functionally integrated entities (Santelices, 1999). 
Insofar as reproduction is generally regarded as the process 
by which new individuals are generated, the notion of 
individuality plays an inevitable central role in studies on 
reproduction (Fusco and Minelli, 2019, p. 25). However, despite 
this apparent centrality of individuality in reproduction, 
pregnancy has not received much attention in the context of 
this debate. Recently, Kingma (2019b) has tentatively discussed 
how some criteria for biological individuality (taken from 
Clarke, 2010) may apply to the entities involved in mammalian 
pregnancy. Kingma does not defend these criteria or their 
application, but poses “[t]he merit of the exercise in raising 
the question.” In contrast, in this paper, we  do take a stance 
for a given understanding of biological individuality in the 
case of pregnancy. In this section, we  contrast our proposal 
of pregnancy as a historical kind of individual with the three 
core concepts of biological individuality currently discussed 
in the philosophy of biology, namely the physiological, the 
evolutionary, and the ecological approaches, and consider their 
merits and shortcomings as applied to the individuality of 
eutherian pregnancy (see Table  1).
Physiological Individuality
The physiological notion of individuality captures the most 
intuitive view of biological individuals as autonomous, 
functionally integrated, and self-maintaining systems, separated 
from their environments. It underlies the classical views of 
“organisms” developed by the physiological tradition in 
biomedicine (e.g., Perlman, 2000), as well as the organizational 
approach in contemporary philosophy of biology (Ruiz-Mirazo 
et al., 2000; Moreno and Mossio, 2015). Criteria for physiological 
individuation comprehend how different functionalities contribute 
to self-maintenance. More recently, they have been expanded 
to include how immune mechanisms enable the delineation 
and persistence of physiological individuals (Pradeu, 2010, 2016b).
From the physiological perspective that guides biomedical 
and bioethical approaches to human pregnancy, it is generally 
considered that pregnancy encompasses two separate organisms, 
namely, the mother and the embryo. While the status of mothers 
as physiological individuals is generally seen as trivially 
uncontroversial, there is no consensus concerning the stage at 
which embryos begin to have a separate individual existence 
in development. Different developmental events have been 
proposed to mark the transition to physiological individuality 
in human embryos, including fertilization (Damschen et  al., 
2006), implantation (Alvargonzález, 2016), gastrulation (Smith 
and Brogaard, 2003), or completion of organogenesis (Nuño 
de la Rosa, 2010). In contrast, recent contributions have challenged 
the assumption that females preserve a physiological individuality 
independent of their offspring during pregnancy. As mentioned 
before, Howes (2008) concluded that immune interactions blur 
the traditional boundaries assumed between mother and offspring, 
and offered a third relational, “not-one-but-not-two,” alternative 
emphasizing the dynamic physical interactions between female 
and embryo. More recently, Kingma (2018, 2019b) has argued 
that, until birth, fetuses do not fulfill the traditional criteria 
for biological individuality, such as being bounded by topological 
frontiers or delineated by physiological or immunological 
mechanisms. Instead, she suggests that it is pregnant females, 
inclusive of their fetuses, that should be considered as individuals, 
although she admits her position to be  compatible with the 
possibility that fetuses are also individuals.
Kingma’s mereological approach to the metaphysical status 
of pregnancy illustrates a general trend in debates on 
“organismality”, which, in focusing on criteria for delineating 
the spatial identity of organisms (i.e., “which sorts of parts 
should be included within the spatial boundaries of individuals”), 
have tended to neglect the problem of the diachronic identity 
of organisms (i.e., “which sorts of events should be  included 
within the temporal boundaries of a life”; DiFrisco and Mossio, 
2021, p. 177). In contrast, the inflammatory events associated 
with implantation and birth provide diachronic criteria for 
the individuation of pregnancy, which, in turn, can 
be  characterized by the specific series of developmental events 
constituting this developmental stage.
In this sense, pregnant females might not be  best viewed 
as being themselves organisms, but rather as developmental 
stages in the life cycle of certain (eutherian) organisms. After 
all, life cycles of most plant and animal groups involve 
dramatic developmental transformations and varied 
reproductive phases (Fusco and Minelli, 2019). Just like 
metamorphosis, pregnancy might be  considered as a new 
organizational form associated with a new developmental 
stage, rather than as a new individual. However, we  believe 
that the spatio-temporal criteria for physiological individuality 
do not exhaust the kind of individuality that pregnancy brings 
about. Besides that, pregnancy needs to be  recognized as a 
reproductive individuality which is irreducible to that of 
developmental or physiological individuality. Unlike the 
TABLE 1 | Comparative table of concepts of biological individuality and how 
they apply to pregnancy.
Entities Criteria for 
individuation
Number and kinds 












Units of selection Three (mother’s, 
father’s, and 
embryo’s genes)
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physiological systems participating in organismic maintenance 
(such as the digestive, circulatory or respiratory systems), 
reproductive functionalities are not just contributions to the 
self- or the scaffolded homeostasis of individual organisms, 
but to a different type of homeostasis, namely the maintenance 
of pregnancy as a relational process that might involve different 
physiological individuals (Pavličev et  al., 2017; Stadtmauer 
and Wagner, 2020a,b). As a consequence, physiological and 
reproductive criteria of individuality do not necessarily render 
the same entities, although they might overlap at certain 
stages of the life cycle. Thus, embryos might be  considered 
to be  physiologically individuated before birth, but to belong 
to the reproductive system until birth. In this sense, even 
if birth is seen as an arbitrary event from the perspective 
of the physiological individuality of embryos, it sets a temporal 
limit to reproductive individuality, insofar as it breaks the 
relation inaugurated by implantation and entails an integral 
reaccomodation of both the female and the embryo 
physiologies.7 It is this new kind of reproductive individual, 
we  claim, that is individuated in evolution, giving rise to a 
novel historical individual which includes the whole lineage 
of eutherian pregnant females.
Evolutionary Individuality
The evolutionary notion of individuality sets the mainstream 
view in the philosophy of biology. In the conceptual framework 
of the Modern Synthesis, individuals are understood as 
theoretical entities of evolutionary biology, namely, those that 
play a role in the theory of evolution by natural selection, 
their main features being variation, heritability, and differential 
fitness (Godfrey-Smith, 2013). From this perspective, entities 
below and above the level of the organism, such as genes, 
groups or species, can also work as individuals understood 
as units of selection.
As we  saw above, the conflict hypothesis is the mainstream 
hypothesis in evolutionary explanations of pregnancy. This view 
attributes interests to the genes (alleles of maternal and paternal 
origin), which are “expressed” through their interactors: mothers 
and embryos, the latter acting as the vehicle of both paternal 
and maternal interests. Although conflict applies to the genes 
and not to their carriers, as Haig (2014) himself has warned 
about, under this model, pregnancy features as a place of 
negotiation of the presumed interests of separate individuals 
(namely, the mother, the father, and the embryo), rather than 
as a biological system on its own. In contrast, our notion of 
historical individuality reveals an important contrast to this 
conventional evolutionary conceptualization of pregnancy. While, 
from an evolutionary genetic perspective (leaving mitochondrial 
7 It might be  argued that birth is an arbitrary event from a reproductive 
perspective, given the extended period of neonatal immaturity that follows 
birth in some mammals, and their dependence on lactation. In this view, the 
physiological individuality of pregnant females would gradually disintegrate 
after birth by changing the set of maternal-offspring interdependencies to others, 
individuality becoming a matter of degree. While this is a plausible interpretation, 
such a position would not be  able to individuate pregnancy, but rather the 
more general kind of relationship mediating mothers and offspring among 
mammals, including oviparous mammals.
genes aside), paternal and maternal roles are ontologically 
equivalent, from a reproductive perspective, they are not. The 
reason is that the latter account integrates into the process of 
reproduction the genetic, morphological, developmental, and 
physiological processes which affect material reproductive 
relations among living systems and which result in the production 
of a new organism with a new life history.
Nonetheless, evolutionary approaches to individuality are 
not necessarily committed to a gene-centered view of 
reproduction. Under non-reductionist approaches to Darwinian 
individuality where organisms, groups, or even species can 
be  considered as units of selection, pregnant females including 
their offspring might be seen as evolutionary individuals seeking 
to maximize fitness. According to the criteria used by Clarke 
(2010) or Godfrey-Smith (2013), pregnant females would not 
be considered as single evolutionary individuals because mother 
and offspring are genetically different, even though they have 
partially overlapping fitness interests. Nonetheless, Kingma 
(2019b) seems to reach the opposite conclusion when she 
analyzes the individuality of pregnancy from an evolutionary 
perspective. In this case, it might be  argued that our proposed 
notion of historical individual and that of evolutionary individuals 
overlap for the case of pregnancy, thus rendering ours superfluous. 
However, we  believe that the virtues of identifying new kinds 
of biological individuals do not lie in their distinctive delineating 
capacities, but rather in their abilities to explain phenomena 
that other notions of individuality are unable to explain (DiFrisco, 
2019). Tracking the pregnant female as a historical individual 
accounts for the developmental basis that explains the boundaries 
and persistence of pregnancy, the distinct evolvability of this 
reproductive system, and the associated changes that take place 
in the eutherian lineage after the emergence of pregnancy. 
None of these phenomena belongs to the explananda of 
selectionist explanations of pregnancy as a reproductive strategy.
Ecological Individuality
An important contribution to the debate on biological 
individuality has surfaced in the last decade out of the greater 
attention paid to how relations of organisms with the biotic 
and abiotic milieu challenge some of our received assumptions 
on individuality. While the ecological notion of individuality 
(Huneman, 2014) can be  applied to composites including 
nonliving parts, it has been particularly influential in discussions 
on the status of multi-species partnerships (Queller and 
Strassmann, 2016; Hernández and Vecchi, 2019), and more 
specifically of symbiotic associations (Gilbert et al., 2012; Gilbert 
and Tauber, 2016). So-called “holobionts” challenge the view 
of individuals as non-problematic well-bounded entities, some 
claiming that certain symbiotic associations can be understood 
as collective individuals (Chiu and Gilbert, 2015) or as “hybrids” 
made of individuals of different lineages (Chiu and Eberl, 2016). 
Importantly, ecological reflections on the status of symbionts 
do not necessarily attempt to replace the physiological and 
evolutionary criteria of individuality. Rather, symbionts might 
be individuated differently depending on the adopted perspective. 
Thus, some consider holobionts as units of selection 
(Roughgarden et  al., 2018), while others admit that some 
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symbionts do count as physiological, but not as evolutionary, 
individuals (Godfrey-Smith, 2015).
Debates on the consequences of symbiotic relationships for 
the individuation of biological entities have an obvious 
counterpart in thinking of the individuality of pregnancy. One 
might claim that females and embryos are contingently engaged 
forming a heterogeneous entity, whereas from the holobiont 
perspective, one could posit that the pregnant female is a 
collective individual including female and embryo(s) as same 
species parts, together with allospecies microbiota. This is the 
line followed by Chiu and Gilbert (2015) when they argue 
that the interactions between mother, fetus, and symbionts 
during pregnancy reciprocally construct each other’s experienced 
environments, facilitating the scaffolding of their development 
and reproduction.
Scaffolding has been a candidate model for understanding 
the pregnancy relation. The notion of scaffolding has been 
conceived of in manifold ways. Sometimes scaffolds are defined 
as those organic resources used in development and reproduction, 
that, contrary to those fueling metabolism, are not incorporated 
into the system (Minelli, 2016). These include parents, members 
of symbiosis, and non-living products of metabolism. In sum, 
resources that are required to explain, yet remain distinct from 
the scaffolded organism. In this context, pregnancy has been 
conceptualized as a source of nutrition for the embryo. In 
other cases, developmental scaffolding is interpreted as an 
instance of the evolutionary tendency towards exploiting 
increasingly organized developmental environments (Griesemer, 
2014a). Then pregnancy appears as providing a new “ontogenetic 
niche” (i.e., the uterus; Stotz, 2008) that increases the reliability 
of development (Chiu and Gilbert, 2015). Following a further 
relational insight, scaffolding may include not only interactions 
between developers and scaffolds, but also “prostheses,” i.e., 
those parts that, like nests, enhance or substitute for developed 
parts (Griesemer, 2014a). Under this view, pregnancy might 
be  seen as one of many possible parent-offspring relations, in 
which some form of strong collaboration transiently emerges. 
For instance, Griesemer discusses the example of haptic contact 
between a parent and her child holding hands to cross a street 
as a form of hybrid individual characterized by their temporary 
fusion (Griesemer, 2018).
Yet, we  believe that in eutherian reproduction, the female 
is not a mere scaffold for embryonic development, either 
conceptualized as a stable environment, a source of nutrition, 
or a facilitator of development. Rather, mother and embryo 
participate in the co-production of the offspring, by forming 
a transient reproductive individual. In our view, the distinct 
status of pregnant females as compared to other forms of 
ecological individuality resulting from scaffolding relationships 
lies in the historical, intrinsic nature of the relation, in that 
it is itself an evolved entity, in which both sides of the relation 
are modified specifically in, and for this relation. In the case 
of pregnancy, its individuality is transitional, but it does have 
a beginning and an end: pregnancy inaugurates a reproductive 
individual in which female and embryo are transiently entangled 
from implantation to birth. This does not mean that pregnant 
females are the only instance of historical individuals including 
heterogeneous entities. Some kin associations such as insect 
colonies (which also include members of the same species at 
different stages of their life cycle) or multispecies aggregates 
such as symbiotic ones might be  considered as historical 
individuals in a similar sense.
Our brief survey of the main current notions of biological 
individuality and the stance(s) of each in the case of pregnancy, 
confirms the current pluralist consensus on the topic (Pradeu, 
2016a). Most participants in the debate agree that different 
notions of biological individuality depend on the questions 
asked or the perspective favored for solving a particular problem, 
and are largely relative to the methods and practices used to 
individuate empirical processes of concern in each disciplinary 
context (Bueno et  al., 2018; Griesemer, 2018; Love, 2018). 
We  have shown how different approaches to individuality, as 
inspired in the epistemic goals of different biological disciplines, 
use non-overlapping criteria of individuation that lead to 
different delineations and conceptualizations of pregnancy. More 
importantly, in looking at practices of individuation in evo-devo, 
a neglected field in the philosophical debate on individuality, 
we  have identified a new concept of biological individuality. 
As applied to pregnancy, our concept of historical individuality, 
according to which pregnant females are evolved forms of 
individual living organizations, brings forward a new perspective 
not covered by the rest of the conceptions.
CONCLUSION
The main aim of this article has been to challenge the received 
view of pregnancy as consisting of two separate individuals, 
and to offer an alternative conception stemming from recent 
evolutionary developmental studies. Thus, we  have argued that 
eutherian reproduction is characterized by a developmental 
integration of physiological and immune processes so that 
pregnant females need to be  accounted for as individuals. 
We  have proposed a novel notion of biological individuality 
to account for this, namely that of historical individuality, 
according to which living entities, including pregnant females, 
are individuated using the evo-devo criteria of persistence and 
non-exchangeability. The individuality of eutherian pregnancy 
is of a historical reproductive kind because it originated in 
evolution as a particular organization of relations that fulfill 
those criteria.
Concepts of individuality are required “in order to tell stories 
about what goes on in the world, do science, and make 
attributions of properties, relations, responsibility (causal or 
moral), and standing (e.g., epistemic, moral, and legal).” 
(Griesemer, 2018, p. 138). Although we  do not deal with this 
issue in this paper, it is evident that both biology and medicine 
have so far overlooked the individuality of pregnant females, 
and this has had far-reaching consequences, not only for 
biomedical practices on human pregnancy, but also for social 
interpretations of reproduction. We  think that taking into 
account in those fields the thesis we  present here, namely, 
that pregnant females are historical kinds of individuals, can 
positively contribute to reverse important misconceptions.
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